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Many histories of genetics have been written by (former) geneticists 
(Sturtevant 2001 [1965]; Dunn 1965; Stubbe 1972) and this book follows 
this tradition. Its author worked in the field for several decades before he 
turned to the history and philosophy of biology. Nevertheless, this book 
is far from being the kind of history of heroic discoveries that scientists 
write in order to maintain the social order in their field, demarcate their 
discipline or underline claims of priority (see Abir-Am 1982 for such 
strategies). Indeed, Raphael Falk´s writing in the history and philosophy 
of biology in general and on genetics in particular was characterized by a 
critical attitude from the beginning. He scrutinized central concepts, such 
as the gene (Falk 1986), or dominance (Falk 1991) that have been taken 
for granted by practicing scientists and sometimes also by philosophers 
and historians, and he showed through historical analysis how they ac-
quired their status as apparently self-evident building blocks of biological 
knowledge. This book continues this thread, without, however, being a 
mere collection of previously published articles. Instead, in the book Falk 
weaves a longue durée history of genetic thinking that not only presents 
new material, but also points out relations between developments he has 
described in earlier works.
 The question is rather how the book relates to the many other histo-
ries of genetics that have accumulated since the mid of the 20th century. 
While many books in the field are either restricted to (roughly) the period 
from Mendel´s experiments (or their rediscovery) to the molecularization 
of genetics in the 1950´s (Carlson 1966; Bowler 1989) or concentrate only 
on the molecular era (Morange 2000; Kay 2000), others set the focus on 
particular events such as Crick and Watson´s formulation of a model for 
the structure of DNA in 1953 (Olby 1974) or the elucidation of protein 
synthesis in the 1950s (Rheinberger 1997). Falk´s book, instead, covers 
the ground from Mendel to modern genomics, paying attention to the ef-
fects of genetic thinking on evolutionary and developmental biology as 
well.
 While other recent long term histories of genetics broaden the per-
spective towards the prehistory of Mendelism as well as the cultural 
background and repercussions of genetic knowledge (Müller-Wille and 
Rheinberger 2009), Falk´s narrative remains within the more narrowly 
defined boundaries of scientific developments. It is, however, neither a 
history of ideas, nor a history of objects. It is a book on the history of sci-
entific practice in genetics, but not in the sense of what came to be called 
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the material practice of science, the building blocks or representational 
output of experimental systems. The book rather follows the history of 
what can best be described as a research methodology: genetic analysis.
 The shortest definition of this methodology that can be found in the 
book states that “Genetic analysis is the art of analyzing the phenomena 
of heredity by hybridization” (4). The book “presents the study of inher-
itance as a conception directed by a methodology. As such the book is 
organized as a historical study of the design of experimental evidence and 
its application to genetic theories” (4).
The book is structured in seven parts, which in turn comprise several 
chapters. The parts do roughly cover successive periods in the history of 
genetics, but, since they focus on different aspects of genetic analysis, 
they partly look at the same series of developments from different angles, 
which results in a rich and complex picture of genetic thinking.
 The first part concentrates on the distinction between the hybrid-
ist and morphogenist traditions in natural history. According to Falk, the 
former is associated with Linnaeus and utilizes hybridization of plants and 
animals to determine the types of beings given in nature, while the sec-
ond is rather associated with Buffon, Lamarck and Darwin and character-
ized by a nominalist account on classification and the acknowledgement 
of change in the forms of organisms. Falk then continues by explaining 
Mendel´s approach as being rooted in the hybridist tradition. The second 
part shows how the persistence of the two traditions structured the ne-
gotiations concerning the relations of Mendelian factors and observable 
characteristics of organisms in the beginning of the 20th century. The third 
part describes the interaction of genetics and cytology, that resulted in the 
chromosome theory of inheritance in the hands of the Morgan school. It 
becomes clear that cytological findings do not only explain genetic prob-
lems, but that genetic analysis can be used to study cellular structures. 
Part IV reconstructs the attempts to move from an instrumental to a mate-
rial understanding of the gene, in particular in the context of mutagenesis 
experiments by Muller and others. The fifth part elaborates the transition 
(though not paradigm shift) from classical genetics to molecular genet-
ics, in particular in the context of bacteria-phage systems. Part VI shows 
how the picture of gene function became increasingly complicated, espe-
cially in the context of developmental biology. The seventh part, finally, 
discusses how, even if conceptual reductionism was overcome, genetic 
analysis as a methodology remains an integral part of biology in the ge-
nomic and post-genomic era.
 Even if the history of genetic thinking is told in adequate complexity, 
such a history necessarily has to suffer from the fact that the focus on one 
aspect of biological thinking results in a somewhat biased view. Since the 
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gene has become such a central concept in biology, historians and philoso-
phers have paid much attention to its genesis. In this way, by analysing 
and at times criticizing the genocentricity of biologists, historians and phi-
losophers have become somewhat genocentric themselves. For instance, 
the mere fact that there are more histories written on genetics than on em-
bryology makes the latter discipline look marginal, which reinforces the 
view that biology became dominated by genetic ideas. In a way this book 
reinforces this trend. But as I said, every history must be selective and at 
least this leaves space for further explorations in the history of biology.
There are two related historiographic themes that structure the histori-
cal analysis of genetics. One concerns the dialectic between methodologi-
cal reductionism and conceptual reductionism. The other deals with the 
alleged break between classical and molecular genetics.
 With respect to the first theme, Falk observes that genetic analysis 
is “characterized by methodological reductionism, the assumption that em-
pirically following single variables is the effective way to bridge realms” 
(4). This does not imply, though, that genetic analysis entails conceptual 
reductionism, which holds that phenomena are determined and thus can be 
explained through the individual action of, or interaction between compo-
nents on a more basic level. Indeed, geneticists who embraced conceptual 
reductionism and those who denied it could work together under the same 
methodological reductionist research agenda as exemplified by Thomas 
Hunt Morgan and his student Hermann Muller. While Morgan restricted 
himself to methodological reductionism and thus conceptualized the gene as 
an instrumental variable, Muller pushed towards a material understanding of 
the gene, which entailed conceptual reductionism (see esp. Parts III and IV). 
And even if conceptual reductionism dominated for some time, epitomized 
by Francis Crick´s Central Dogma, which states that the nucleotide se-
quence of DNA determines the sequence of RNA, which in turn determines 
the sequence of amino acids in protein synthesis and that no information 
can travel back from protein sequence to DNA sequence, researchers today, 
working under a more integrative conception of the genome can utilize the 
results produced under the assumption of conceptual reductionism, because 
to a large extent they share with earlier generations the basic reductionist 
methodologies of genetic analysis (see esp. Parts VI and VII).
 Concerning the role of reductionism, one of Falk´s strongest contri-
butions to the history and philosophy of genetics is to point out that there 
is a host of concepts such as dominant and recessive traits/alleles (Ch. 19), 
expressivity and penetrance of alleles (p. 210), pleiotropy and epistasis 
or phenocopy (216), as well as junk DNA (250ff.), that function “not as 
explanations of gene actions, but rather as formal devices to overcome 
inconsistencies in the determinist ‘genocentric’ conceptions of genetics in 
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the 1920s to 1940s” (216). While others have written much about the con-
cept of the gene, other central concepts in genetics have often been taken 
less critically, although Falk´s writing makes clear how the gene concept 
is construed through its relation to these other concepts.
 Concerning the second major theme, Falk describes the book as “an 
argument against a conceptual discontinuity between ‘classical’ and ‘mo-
lecular’ theories of genetics” (4). He writes: “I propose that it is more 
meaningful historically and more helpful scientifically to view these not 
as two theories, but as one continuous theory that deals with the same ar-
ray of problems at different levels of resolution” (3). Falk thus contrasts 
the consensus of discontinuity histories that describe the shift from classi-
cal to molecular genetics as a relatively sharp break – which either results 
in a successful reduction of the former to the latter or leaves us with two 
Kuhnian paradigms – with a picture of continuity in the methodology. The 
transition is rather to be described as a move from phenomenological ge-
netic analysis to molecular genetic analysis. But the basic structure of the 
method remains the same, for instance when in “modern genetic analysis, 
SNPs (single nucleotide polymorphisms) replace wrinkled peas and the 
white-eyed flies as markers” (156), or when hybridization is performed 
on the level of DNA and RNA molecules (Ch. 17). In general, the history 
of genetic analysis is depicted by Falk as a history of increasing resolving 
power, moving from phenomenological traits of organisms to behaviors of 
unicellular organisms, to proteins, to DNA itself (SNPs) on the side of the 
markers that indicate the genotype and from factors in the constitution of 
the germ cells to hypothetical genes, to loci on chromosomes, to DNA on 
the side of the units of genetic transmission.
A final remark that can be made is that Falk´s argument resonates in-
terestingly with an article by the philosopher Ken Waters in which he asks 
“What was classical genetics?” (Waters 2004). Waters argues that the focus 
on theory and explanation in science by philosophers (and to some extent 
also by historians) led to the view that classical genetics was concerned 
solely with the explanation of patterns of inheritance of traits, whereas this 
was the aim only in an early phase of genetics. From the 1920s onwards, 
instead, geneticists rather used these explanatory patterns to investigate a 
wide range of basic biological phenomena, including development. Waters 
points out that also historians who focus on the material practice of genet-
ics (in particular Kohler 1994) are unable to see how established theory 
and material practice interact in the study of unknown realms, because they 
neglect the role of theory. According to Waters – and this likens his account 
to Falk´s – one has to focus on the investigative strategy, what he calls the 
“genetic approach,” in order to see how genetics as a “ conception directed 
by a methodology,” to use Falk´s words, became an instrument in biology.
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Even though Falk´s account on genetic analysis is much broader than 
Waters´s and extends the analysis to the developments in the second half 
of the twentieth century up to today´s post genomic research agendas, 
both works can be seen as forming a new attempt to integrate the history 
of theories and concepts and the history of experimental practice. In this 
sense the book is genuinely innovative.
To conclude, the book will be useful for those working in the history 
not only of genetics but in the history of biology in the 20th century in gen-
eral that is to a large extent influenced by genetic thinking. Furthermore, 
philosophers engaged in the analysis of genetic concepts will benefit from 
the historical reconstruction as well as from the more philosophical re-
marks embedded in the historical narrative.
The book is at times quite technical with respect to the biological 
detail, to an extent that is not always justified by the main historiographic 
argument that is developed. While this not much of a problem for those 
familiar with the field and even an advantage for those who are interested 
in the particular histories of those findings which are discussed in more 
detail, it does not recommend the book for undergraduate courses in the 
history of biology, though it might be suitable for advanced biology stu-
dents. Apart from that, the book is well written and properly edited.
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Theodore Sider, Logic for Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2010, 304 pp.
Sider’s book is a welcomed addition to the series of logic textbooks pub-
lished by Oxford University Press, taking its place as a good introduction 
aiming to provide a great supportive textbook for students of philosophy 
from the beginning of their education to the very end, and serving as a 
valuable handbook afterwards helping them in their research in areas of 
philosophy which employ a considerable amount of formal logic, includ-
ing, but not limited to, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language 
and philosophy of science.
It is interesting to notice that the book was dedicated to perhaps one 
of the most influential contemporary philosophers, Ed Gettier, and, while 
this is not worthwhile information per se, it sets the tone for the entire 
